Colonialist ways of thinking in Hegel's Philosophy of History and Freud's Metapsychology


I.          "The European spirit has strange roots." (Fanon)

II.        "The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present."(Hegel)

1.         "How can the poor Moor help not being as white as we …"

2.         "In order to become sages, we must first become beasts …" (Montaigne).

III. Notes



 "We carry with us the wonders, we seeke without us: There is all Africa, and her prodigies in us; …

Thomas BROWNE, 1643


"Despite the three or four centuries in which the inhabitants of Europe have been inundating the other parts of the world and inexorably publishing new collections of travel and journey descriptions, of all the peoples we only, I am persuaded, know the Europeans exactly; moreover, in the light of the ridiculous prejudices that have still not died out, even amongst writers, it seems that any study of mankind under whatever resplendent name provides nothing more than a study of the people of the author's own country."


Jean Jacques ROUSSEAU, 1755


"As we have said before, the Negro represents natural man in all his savagery and unruliness; if one wants to understand him correctly, one has to abstract from him all human respect and morality. In this character there is nothing that reminds one of the human."


G.W.F. HEGEL, 1837 (1822-31)


" You will not expect me to have much to tell you that is new about the Id apart from its new name. It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know of it we have learnt from our study of the dream-work and of the construction of neurotic symptoms and most of that is of a negative character and can be described only as a contrast to the ego. We approach the Id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influences, and as there taking up into itself [p.499] instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it but we cannot say in what substratum. It is filed with energy reaching it from the instincts, but has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle."


Sigmund FREUD, 1933


Hegel's characterisation of Africa (in the section on the "Geographical basis of history " in his Philosophy of History) shows a number of remarkable parallels to Sigmund Freud's description of the Id (in the 31st "Lecture on the Introduction to Psychoanalysis. New Series").

It would be easy to assume that such similarities could be shown to be merely accidental relationships, as ideas that may be due to a (necessarily) fragmentary reading. Nevertheless, the – initially apparently only superficial – analogies between Hegel's and Freud's studies led me to make a more detailed structural comparison.

The first part of this article will present a textual comparison, more or less as an assembly of quotations from Hegel's Philosophy of History and Freud's Introductory Lectures; in the second part, I shall set out a number of conclusions and consequences that might result from the collage of quotations.


I. "The European spirit has strange roots." (Fanon)

Hegel talks of three characteristic geographical structures that are considered to be the essential basis for the course of world history: "(1) The arid elevated land with its extensive steppes and plains. (2) The valley plains — the Land of Transition permeated and watered by great Streams. (3) The coast region in immediate connection with the sea." (131) The three continents of Africa, Asia and Europe (in this context Hegel says nothing at all about America) are considered to be representatives of the geographical principles in different ways. Although the said three moments occur in all three continents, they vary in extent and domination. Africa was determined by the principle of the elevated land (with the exception of the Nile and the Mediterranean coast), Asia characterised by the conflict between elevated land and the valley plains (of China, India, Babylon etc). Finally, Europe is seen as the "mild transition" (148) between the geographical extremes, the emphasis being placed on the central position of the Mediterranean for the course of world history. "Africa has for its leading classical feature the Upland, Asia the contrast of river regions with the Upland, Europe the mingling of these several elements." (135) It is to the uplands that the nomadic forms of life are to be ascribed, for "The region which these families occupy is unfruitful or productive only temporarily: the inhabitants have their property not in the land — from which they derive only a trifling profit — but in the animals that wander with them." (132) This contrasts with the valley plains, where above all the possibility of regular irrigation is the precondition for agriculture and settlement. "The valley-plain attaches him to the soil; it involves him in an infinite multitude of dependencies, but the sea carries him out beyond these limited circles." (133f) The water, the sea is seen by Hegel as being the actual unifying factor, "because intercourse by land is much more difficult that by water." (133) ("intercourse" is apparently a euphemistic expression for "conquest" and "plunder" …). The specific nature of the sea is also the reason for southern Europe's special position in the history of the world: "For the three quarters of the globe the Mediterranean Sea is similarly the uniting element, and the centre of World-History." (130) And "only through the fact of being a sea, has the Mediterranean become a focus of national life." (133) (it is true that the Asians also have access to the sea – but do not understand how to use this access: "This stretching out of the sea beyond the limitations of the land, is wanting to the splendid political edifices of Asiatic States, although they themselves border on the sea — as for example, China. For them the sea is only the limit, the ceasing of the land; they have no positive relation to it." (134f))


It is in this context that we must now consider Hegel's polemical analysis of "Africa proper", the "land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night." (135). However, before entering this discussion in detail, a brief reference should be made to Freud's approach (from the 31st Lecture). The 31st Lecture deals with the "dissection of the psychical personality". This breakdown is developed through three topoi: to create the triad of the Ego, the Id and the Superego. (However, on a closer reading one might find that both Hegel and Freud actually refer to four principles: Upland, valley plain, shore land and the sea can constitute the unconscious and the pre-conscious (and the waking conscious), "it has to serve three severe masters, and does what it can to bring their claims and demands into harmony with one another. … The three tyrannical masters are the external world, the super-ego and the id." (514). Freud's attempt to clarify the relationship between the said instances by means of a diagram (of which we will speak below) strongly recall a map; he even speaks of the "three provinces of the mental apparatus" (510). And finally in this context he states: "Analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but they can may make one feel more at home." (510). This is followed by the geographical comparison: "I am

imagining a country with a landscape of varying configuration – hill-country , plains, and chains of lakes-, and with a mixed population: it is inhabited by Germans, Magyars and Slovaks, who carry on different activities. Now things might be partitioned in such a way that the Germans, who breed cattle, live in the hill-country , the Magyars, who grow cereals and wine, live in the plains, and the Slovaks, who catch fish and plait reeds, live by the lakes." (510). It is thus indicative that Freud also associates the hill-country (the uplands) with (in Hegel, nomadic) cattle breeding, the plains (valley plain) with tillage and the chain of lakes (shore land ) with acquisition through plunder (only fishing, but nevertheless…).

The starting point of Freund's work is the symptom, the non-ego (Hegel's "beyond … conscious history"!). It derives from the suppressed, and is, as Freud said, "an internal foreign country" for the ego (496). From the symptom the path leads to the unconscious, to the life of instinct, to sexuality – the "Id". "This impersonal pronoun seems particularly suitable for expressing the main character of this province of the soul, the fact of its being alien to the ego. The Superego, the Ego and the Id – these, then, are the three reigns, regions, provinces, into which we divide an individual's mental apparatus …" (510). The Id is regarded as the "dark" inaccessible part of our personality, describable only as the "opposite of the Ego". "Id " is Freud's Black continent.

Just as the Id remains closed to the outside world, Hegel also speaks of the "closed nature" of Africa; and just as Freud claims to know but little of the Id ("except for its new name"), Hegel refers to "Africa proper" the "upland almost entirely unknown to us". Freud and Hegel both speak about something that they refer to as the "unknown" and that they want to illuminate. For, this unknown is to be related to something else: for Hegel, the European, for Freud, the Ego. From the coast, "the system of perception and awareness" (with Freud, also the "Front" 1)), they penetrate into the "hinterland" through the swamp, the pre-conscious, into the uplands.


Hegel writes about black Africa:

"The land surrounded by these mountains is an unknown Upland, from which on the other hand the Negroes have seldom made their way through. In the sixteenth century occurred at many very distant points, outbreaks of terrible hordes which rushed down upon the more peaceful inhabitants of the declivities. Whether any internal movement had taken place, or if so, of what character, we do not know. What we do know of these hordes, is the contrast between their conduct in their wars and forays themselves — which exhibited the most reckless inhumanity and disgusting barbarism — and the fact that afterwards, when their rage was spent, in the calm time of peace, they showed themselves mild and well disposed towards the Europeans, when they became acquainted with them." (136)

This description of the unknown, from which an outbreak is made, leading – after inhumanity barbarism and rage – to a mild reconciliation with the known "in the calm time of peace", may recall the struggle between the Ego (represented by the "Europeans") with the unconscious, the animal and instinctive. What is described is a process whose dynamism develops from the transition from the unknown to the known, from the rough to the gentle, from the inhuman to the well-disposed and finally from the African to the European. The analogy between Africa and unconscious becomes even more obvious if one considers Hegel's principle determination of the black continent:

"The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality. In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence — as for example, God, or Law — in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own being. This distinction between himself as an individual and the universality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so that the Knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting. The Negro, as already observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality — all that we call feeling — if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character." (137)

In summary, it could be said that the African principle is difficult to comprehend because there is nothing human in it (inhumanity is referred to with various expressions: disrespect, immorality, untainted, wild, natural, etc.); essentially, it is a lack of distinctions that prevails: the general, the particular and the individual are not kept apart and this lack of distinction leads on the one hand to godlessness, and on the other hand to lawlessness.

Freud, for his part, considers the Id to be the "dark, inaccessible part of our personality", and states: "You will not expect me to have much to tell you that is new about the id apart from its new name." (511). The Id, too, can essentially only be determined by negative differentiation: by listing everything that it is not, does not know or cannot be. "What little we know of it we have learnt from our study of the dream-work and of the construction of neurotic symptoms and most of that is of a negative character and can be described only as a 'primitive and irrational character'." (512) In addition, the Id, like Hegel's Africa, is characterised by a "lack of differentiation": "There is nothing in the Id that could be compared to negation." (511) This lack of differentiation leads to the invalidity of logical laws and moral rules. "The logical laws of thought do not apply in the Id and this is true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other; at the most they may converge to form compromises under the dominating economic pressure towards the discharge of energy." (511)

And in addition: "It goes without saying that the Id knows no values, no good and no evil, no morality." (512) The African's lack of history corresponds with the timelessness of the unconscious: "There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and - a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought - no alteration in its mental processes is produced by the passage of time." (511).

Further parallels are easily discovered between Hegel and Freud's dark continents. Thus Hegel writes about African religion as being "sorcery".

"In sorcery we have not the idea of a God, of a moral faith; it exhibits man as the highest power, regarding him as alone occupying a position of command over the power of Nature. We have here therefore nothing to do with a spiritual adoration of God, nor with an empire of Right. God thunders, but is not on that account recognized as God. For the soul of man, God must be more than a thunderer, whereas among the Negroes this is not the case. Although they are necessarily conscious of dependence upon nature — for they need the beneficial influence of storm, rain, cessation of the rainy period, and so on — yet this does not conduct them to the consciousness of a Higher Power: it is they who command the elements, and this they call 'magic.'" (138)

Freud, too (following Sir Frazer), has no high opinion of sorcery, which he compared inter alia with compulsory neuroses in "Totem and Taboo" or in the 35th Lecture: " Their reliance on magic was, as we suppose, derived from their overvaluation of their own intellectual operations, from their belief in the .omnipotence of thoughts', which, incidentally, we come upon again in our obsessional neurotic patients." (592).

Hegel considers fetishism to be a particular type of African natural religion, sorcery, and it is characterised by the fact that it exalts to the dignity of a "genius" the first thing that comes in its way, whether it is an "animal, a tree, a stone, or a wooden figure" (138). Hegel derives the term "fetish" from the Portuguese "fetizo", sorcery; what in fetishism appears to indicate something general to be worshipped, proves to be "the arbitrary fancy of the individual": for, "if rain is suspended, if there is a failure in the crops, they bind and beat or destroy the Fetich and so get rid of it, making another immediately, and thus holding it in their own power." (139) (Fritz Kramer regards Hegel's analyses of African fetishism as an "involuntary satire of the rise of capitalism", "in which man is reduced to the status of a product but where the product is worshipped as a fetish." 2)). It is true that Freud's concept of fetishism would not assume that the "fetish lies in the power" of the fetish", nevertheless he shares Hegel's disparagement of fetishism, and the notion that the fetish can be any object to which this specific quality must first be ascribed. Freud speaks of those "to whom even a body part means nothing but where instead an item of clothing satisfies all wishes, a shoe, a piece of white underwear", and then immediately moves on to necrophilia, finally coming to the sudden end: "Enough outrage on this page!" (302). One could discuss in much more detail the extent to which fetishism can be represented as a consequence of a failed upbringing, where the child as "polymorphic perverse being" becomes the ideal representative of the "natural man".

Hegel places fetishism alongside the Negro's "worship of the dead", "in which their deceased forefathers and ancestors are regarded by them as a power influencing the living." (139) He criticizes this worship of the dead because it does not respect death: "Death itself is looked upon by the Negroes as no universal natural law; even this, they think, proceeds from evil-disposed magicians." (139). From this "disrespect of death", Hegel concludes a "disrespect of life" (141), of which we shall speak below. The African ignorance of death as a "general natural law" again corresponds with Freud's thesis that the Ego behaves as if there were no death: "Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred." (511), and at another point he states: "thus in the psychoanalytical school, one might dare to claim that fundamentally, no-one believes in his own death, or, which amounts to the same, in the unconscious; everyone one of us is convinced of his immortality." 3) (At this point, a brief comment might be appropriate. It goes without saying that in this structural comparison I am not (only) interested in showing that Hegel's polemical definition of Africa is the same as Freud's "analysis of the Id" – and that possibly both qualifications should be reduced to each other and rejected – but also in showing that Freud's shifting of the "African" into the interior of every human can at the same time be of benefit to a rejection of the Eurocentric elements of Hegel's analysis. At the same time, we must also refer to the colonialisation of the "internal abroad", the "drainage of the Zuydersee" (516). Nevertheless, it appears to be important that alongside the structural similarity, the fundamental difference of both concepts can been seen in the approach to what was to be colonised).

What Hegel thinks of the Negroes is also what he assumes to be their own principle: "In the contempt of humanity displayed by the Negroes, it is not so much a despising of death as a want of regard for life that forms the characteristic feature." (140). Cannibalism, of course, occupies first place: "Cannibalism is looked upon as quite customary and proper"; and cannibalism is seen as related to the inability to perceive man as the bearer of the absolute: "to the essential Negro, human flesh is but an object of sense – mere flesh." (140). (Apparently, Hegel can only explain the ritual of eating the "heart of the slain foe" as an expression of the essential greed for fresh flesh. Such "explanations of the primitive customs are much cruder than the sense of the custom themselves." (4)). The projectives of this view of cannibalism can be determined more closely with Freud: "The instincts (…) Such instincts are those of incest, cannibalism and lusting for murder. (5) (At another point, childish cannibalism is explicitly and expressly emphasised: "There is no need to balk at this cannibalism; it continued far into later times. The essential point, however, is that we attribute the same emotional attitudes to these primitive men that we are able to establish by analytic investigation in the primitives of the present day – in our children." 6)

Hegel's projective definition of the Negro becomes even clearer when he raises slavery (i.e. actually what the Europeans did with the Negroes) to the "characteristic" of the Negro's own way of life. "Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes is Slavery. Negroes are enslaved by Europeans and sold to America. Bad as this may be, their lot in their own land is even worse, since there a slavery quite as absolute exists;" (140): "Parents sell their children, and conversely children their parents, as either has the opportunity." The pervading influence of slavery is related to the condemnable polygamy which – according to Hegel – "has frequently for its object the having many children, to be sold, every one of them, into slavery; and very often naive complaints on this score are heard, as for instance in the case of a Negro in London, who lamented that he was now quite a poor man because he had already sold all his relations." (141) (It would appear that Hegel here has transferred many of the known conditions in the London suburbs and slums, in which the appalling conditions of poverty drove parents to sell their children, to the unknown and imagined black Africa. This is also suggested by the localisation of the characterless Negro who "has already sold all his relations.") The barely concealed justification of the enslaving of the Negro by the European culminates in Hegel's attempt to ascribe genocide to the Negro's "disregard for life", allowing "themselves to be shot down by thousands in war with Europeans." (141) Note that genocide is thus not due to a "disregard of life" on the part of the shooter, the perpetrator, but rather on the part of those on whom it is practised. (Hegel, moreover also speaks similarly euphemistically of the destruction of the American natives, who "gradually vanished at the breath of European activity" "as soon as spirit approached it." (123) What the "breath" might have been can only be guessed from the qualification of world history as "slaughter-bench" or "Calvary" …

"It is only in the inverted and not the true world that Hegel recognises the inhuman madness of genocide, one of the principles of the imperialism that mystified his philosophy. "7)).

The constitution of black Africa is described as the unrestricted application of the "natural condition", as a "condition of absolute and thorough injustice" (144). (At this point Hegel's image of Africa recalls Thomas Hobbes' ideas about the natural condition of human society as being a "war of all against all".) From all this it follows that there is actually no constitution at all. Nevertheless, Hegel reports of the practices for the removal of the king or chief: "If the Negroes are discontented with their King they depose and kill him. In Dahomey, when they are thus displeased, the custom is to send parrots’ eggs to the King, as a sign of dissatisfaction with his government." (142) This attitude to the "government" is seen by the state philosopher as an expression of essential and unlimited arbitrary volition: "There is absolutely no bond, no restraint upon that arbitrary volition" (141) If (in agreement with Franz Kramer) we consider Hegel's description of Africa as the projective representation of an "inverted world", it naturally also becomes clear how the reality of the Prussian state ought to deal with subversives and revolutionaries: "Restraints upon this arbitrary volition". The African lack of organisation corresponds with Freud's definition of the Id as "chaos": "It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle." (511) The Id, too, can therefore be understood as an expression for "sensual arbitrary volition": Freud speaks of the "blind striving to satisfy the instincts" (512f) and of "untamed passions" (513) etc.


For Hegel, a further feature of the lack of organisation of the Negro's state system is the phenomenon of the "state composed of women", which is described as particularly repulsive:

"Tradition alleges that in former times a state composed of women made itself famous by its conquests: it was a state at whose head was a woman. She is said to have pounded her own son in a mortar, to have besmeared herself with the blood, and to have had the blood of pounded children constantly at hand. She is said to have driven away or put to death all the males, and commanded the death of all male children. These furies destroyed everything in the neighbourhood, and were driven to constant plunderings, because they did not cultivate the land." (142)

How terrible the concept of the "state composed of women" must have been to Hegel can also be derived from his philosophy of law, in which he states dogmatically. "If women are at the head of the government, the state is at risk since they act not according to the requirements of the generality but according to random inclination and opinion " 8). In summary, it might be assumed that it is their distance from the general that constitutes the common feature of Negroes, women, children and – as we will see below the "mob" and the mass of the population. 

One is almost reluctant to set Freud's views on the Id into this context (of Hegel's abhorrence of a state composed of women); nevertheless, the more differentiated description of the unconscious also shows that a certain proximity between the Id and the feminine is regarded as possible; without going into the details of Freud’s sexual theory, it should be pointed out that Freud assumes a longer child attachment amongst girls, attaches more importance to narcissism for the female psycho-sexual development, holds women's superego generally to be weaker and more dependent than the male etc; finally, he calls the problem of femininity the "black continent". 9)

Freud also says "It is said that the influencing of the ego by the sexual object occurs particularly often with women and is characteristic of femininity," (502) and, finally, he is also familiar with the notion that men are characterised by a greater proximity to the general: "The fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life; for the demand for justice is a modification of envy and lays down the condition subject to which one can put envy aside. We also regard women as weaker in their social interests and as having less capacity for sublimating their instincts than men." (564)

Under the title "Fanaticism" Hegel once again summarises the main feature of the black character. "Fanaticism, which, notwithstanding the yielding disposition of the Negro in other respects, can be excited, surpasses, when roused, all belief." This is followed by a number of horror stories, such as of the following kind: "The drum beat, and a terrible carnage was begun; all who came in the way of the frenzied Negroes in the streets were stabbed." (143) (penetrated?) or: "As a prelude to the war, the King ordains an onslaught upon his own metropolis, as if to excite the due degree of frenzy." (143) Another example: "In Dahomey, when the King dies, the bonds of society are loosed; in his palace begins indiscriminate havoc and disorganization. All the wives of the King (in Dahomey their number is exactly 3,333) are massacred, and through the whole town plunder and carnage run riot." (143) As a general reason for such horror stories, Hegel refers to fanaticism, which is essentially rooted in sensual unrestraint and by no means in any intellectual conviction.

"Every idea thrown into the mind of the Negro is caught up and realized with the whole energy of his will; but this realization involves a wholesale destruction. These people continue long at rest, but suddenly their passions ferment, and then they are quite beside themselves. The destruction which is the consequence of their excitement, is caused by the fact that it is no positive idea, no thought which produces these commotions; — a physical rather than a spiritual enthusiasm." (143)

We no longer need to refer to the expressions already quoted in which Freud refers to the Id as "chaos" and as "a cauldron of seething excitement" (511); what is perhaps still of interest is that Freud notes how "contradictory impulses exist side by side" (511) in the Id, while Hegel considers the interaction between fanaticism and gentleness to be an arbitrary playfulness of the disposition.

Hegel's final comments about the Negro's lack of history and incapacity for education make it clear that the Negro lives without a conscience, without a superego.

"From these various traits it is manifest that want of self-control distinguishes the character of the Negroes. This condition is capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this day, such have they always been. The only essential connection that has existed and continued between the Negroes and the Europeans is that of slavery." (144)

And do not the following sentences make completely clear the projective character of this image of Africa? "What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the World’s History." (145)

In the same emphatic way in which Hegel thinks about the awareness of absolute power, the general, Freud speaks, quoting Kant, of the conscience within us as a "starry sky" (500); like Hegel, he feels that the "many" (and wild) people had developed an insufficient conscience and – like children – were immoral and knew no internal inhibitions against the impulses striving for pleasure. (Incidentally, the formation of conscience is initially the responsibility of external authorities: for Hegel the English, for Freud the parents.)

And a further parallel: Just as Hegel – more or less openly – justifies the necessity of slavery, Freud speaks of the "colonisation" and subjugation of the Id. "Where id was, there shall ego be. It is reclamation work, like the draining of the Zuyder Zee." (516) Slavery also fits to the image of training a horse that Freud introduces in order to illustrate the relationship between the ego and the Id:

"The ego's relation to the id might be compared with that of a rider to his horse. The horse supplies the locomotive energy, while the rider has the privilege of deciding on the goal and of guiding the powerful animal's movement. But only too often there arises between the ego and the id the not precisely ideal situation of the rider being obliged to guide the horse along the path by which it itself wants to go." (514)

Referring to the Greek and Roman state, Hegel speaks of slavery's function as education: it was "a phase of advance from the merely isolated sensual existence — a phase of education — a mode of becoming participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it." (144) For this reason "the gradual abolition of slavery is therefore wiser and more equitable than its sudden removal." (144) This argumentation has held to the present – such as in the political discussion about the gradual release of former colonies into independence, or the question of apartheid in southern Africa.

Finally, the "educational work" of slavery must first educate the person to respect life; this, too, is still a common argument. Independence granted suddenly would merely lead to chaos in the colonised countries, to a bloody carnage of all against all. (At this point, it should briefly be pointed out that the African disregard of life of which Hegel speaks seems to correspond to Freud's concept of the death instinct.)

Perhaps it is not necessary to summarise briefly once again the results of this text comparison, a merely initial comparison that no doubt can be made in much more detail. Nevertheless, it is possible to consider what Hegel's black Africa and Freud's Id have in common – best, perhaps, in the form of a list of insults. Both are: crude, inhuman, illogical, animal, inaccessible, dark, contradictory, negative, chaotic, incapable of development, below, timeless, seething and excited, sudden and cruel, impulsive, perverse, fetishist, magical, ruthless, unorganised, cannibalistic, unscrupulous, godless, ecstatic, revolting, incalculable, fanatic, primitive and irrational, laden with energy, blind, sensuous, arbitrary, wild, childish, withdrawn, incoherent, black as the night.

It is also possible to compare the (pseudo) geographical "maps" of black Africa (according to Hegel's description) and of the Id (according to Freud's own drawing in the 31st Lecture).


II. "The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present." (Hegel)

 What conclusions can now be drawn from this textual comparison?

It would probably be futile to attempt a "psychoanalysis" of the philosopher Hegel – for instance by using the parallels between the similarity between black Africa and the Id to draw conclusions about the philosopher's defensive techniques and resistance. (Nevertheless, such an attempt would not be without interest; however, I feel that the material commented on in the first section is in any event sufficient to stimulate the reader's psychoanalytical imagination …)

Nor, similarly, would it be particularly original to use the material presented to denounce both thinkers (Hegel and Freud) as great "colonisers" or at least apologists for the subjugation of Africa or of the subconscious, as the case may be; again, such a conclusion is in any event so obvious that it is not worth being set out explicitly once again; at the same time, this manner of dealing with the famous and prominent thinkers of the past is somewhat too superficial, at least a little suspect, and is essentially merely an attempt to satisfy one's own narcissism.

Finally, there are in addition many different possibilities of addressing the context presented; starting from a word field analysis, for instance, one could examine the metaphorics of philosophical thinking, the historical roots of the individual metaphors; it would be very revealing, for instance, to examine the metaphor of travel, of the geographically foreign territory as the "terra incognita", the "inverted world" and the like. Comments on the history of the metaphor of a "terra incognita", the "inverted world", are dealt with in Fritz Kramer's investigation under the same name of the imaginary ethnography of the 19th century. It would also certainly be of interest to investigate the relationship between the foreign territory that must be repulsed and – on the one hand – sexuality and eroticism and – on the other hand – the development of capitalism and imperialism of the time. (Thus women and the "lower strata" are exposed representatives of the foreign territory in the heart of bourgeois society, and it could be assumed that the analysis of the "entirely different" – as it were a "projective test" – could also provide information about the attitude of the two theoreticians to the foreign territory within their own society.)

We now wish to address two problematic areas in more detail. Firstly, I am interested by the effect of the theories presented on the relationship of science to the child; on the one hand, this concerns what is known as "black pedagogy", and on the other hand the self-interpretation, the identity of the science that deals with the child (in particular philosophy, psychology and pedagogy). Secondly, I would like to follow this by a number of considerations on the problem of colonisation (of the external and internal foreign territory) and in particular on the question of decolonisation, the "possibility of decolonisation".


1.         "How can the poor Moor help not being as white as we …"

Hegel's presentation of world history and Freud's presentation of individual history are both (however explicitly) based on a model that could be described by the idea of "stage-by-stage sequence", the hierarchically structured advancement of humanity and of the individual. Hegel's "Negroes", like the child still generally directly subject to its instincts in its entire "Idness", are at the lowest level of this "stage-by-stage structure", while the European or the mature genital ego represents more or less the upper rungs of the "ladder of history".

Both models of human "development" imply territorial notions: external and internal continents are presented as political areas, as regions or provinces that are to be conquered, to be "happily drawn over" to Europe (or the ripe Ego) (137), which must be "drained" (516), occupied, researched and subjugated. For this reason, a study of Hegel's and Freud's anthropology also provides a number of revelations about the normative power of the metaphors used to define more closely the "inhuman in the human" – and in human history.

Hegel refers to black Africa as the "land of childhood"; the pedagogical implications are obvious. One might initially state cautiously that probably any theory (possibly in a popularised variant) that operates with hierarchically structured stages of development practically demands a political and pedagogical application (if not exploitation). The various attributes ascribed by Hegel to the Negro, and by Freud to the Id, imply, in the stage-by-stage structure, their opposite as being the educational objective to be achieved. For instance, one might try to complete the individual attributes, the "insults", already listed to create pairs of concepts; this would produce a series in which crude would contrast with sublime, inhuman with human, illogical with logical, animal with human, inaccessible with accessible, dark with light, contradictory with free of contradiction, negative with positive, chaotic with orderly, incapable of development with capable of education, below with above, timeless with aware of time, seething and excited with peaceful and calm, suddenly and cruelly impulsive with always open and at the same time definitively complete, perverse with normal, and so on and so forth. This series of opposing pairs of concepts finally includes Negroes and Europeans, women and men, children and adults.

Assuming (in the stage-by-stage structure) that it is not merely a matter of the formation of a descriptive theory but also a question of practical educational strategy to permit and then to secure the (gradual) transition from the Negro to the European (defined by Hegel as the educational function of slavery) and the (stage-by-stage) transition from the child to the mature adult (with Freud, at least, through the approach of the therapeutic method), it must, however, secondly be implied that the educator has already achieved the corresponding highest stage, or at least understands how to indicate how it can ever be achieved. (That Hegel's philosophy liked to see itself to some extent as the climax, and completion, of the history of humanity, can be assumed to be well known, as is Freud's refusal to have himself analysed by another person. (11)) In other words, it seems to me to be extremely important to consider whether every stage-by-stage theory of human development (whether phylogenetic or ontogenetic) must secretly tend towards the parent theory if it is to be applied in practice (for instance in education). Of course, this says nothing about the historical context of the creation of such stage-by-stage models of development logics.

In summary, it could be concluded that the actual objective of stage-by-stage development logics as an educational strategy must consist of the internalisation of the imposed authority (again, either of the Europeans or of the parents). And for this reason, I argue that Hegel's and Freud's anthropological approaches can at least be assumed not to work against "the ideology" which, relying on social-Darwinist laws, had always ensured "that the physically, culturally and politically powerful also held the power of disposal over the still physically weak, the economically dependent and the politically immature." 12)

The various stage-by-stage models imply the linearisation of the concepts of time made necessary by the fact that the accumulation of capital has prevailed as the supreme social principle. The various transitions cannot be interpreted cyclically, but instead appear as cumulative processes which – and this is a further point – actually can no longer even be completed. At the same time as the cyclic concept of time is censured, the pragmatic concept of the objective – as the "recurrently" achievable" – is abolished. This abolition, in turn, is related to the concept of progress in a society based on the accumulation of capital: A definitive objective of progress no longer exists, and it is for this reason that Benjamin interprets revolutions no longer as being the "locomotives of world history" but rather as "the grasping for the emergency brake by the human race travelling on this train" 13).

It is the linearisation of the concepts of time that first permits the establishment of universal disciplinary institutions, above all in pedagogy. And it is here that one sees very clearly the role that stage-by-stage models are beginning to acquire in practice. "By endlessly 'economising' cumulative processes, i.e. breaking them down into ever smaller and still censurable units, further tableaux are conceivable to each tableau, bringing additional differentiation. In the system of Willich (an educator from the 18th century, Author's comment), the following fields of behaviour were analysed in this way and judged from a disciplinary point of view:

- the body (careful cleaning)

- time (punctual obedience, speed in getting dressed)

- movement (decency in walking and standing)

- language (decency of speech)

- the spirit (laziness, stubbornness, reluctance)

- morals (immoderation, impatience, selfishness)

- activity (awkwardness, inattention)

- material (waste).

The micro-justice attuned to the tableaux worked, as compared with the long-tolerated corporal punishment, with a relatively subtle although not non-violent catalogue of measures." 14) This quotation excellently shows how precisely the objectives to be achieved and the starting characters to be overcome had to be set out in the various fields of educational interest. "Education can be understood as a continuation of the civilising process. The civilising necessities that previously arose in the social integration of the adult are now effective in the contrast between the adult and the non-adult, in the structure that they form, in education." 15)

Discipline also requires its specific space. "For the 'disciplines', any unorganised agglomeration of individuals constituted a condition that was assessed as a latent source of danger. The overview might be lost, individuals could disappear, spontaneous popular uprisings could occur, etc. For this reason, the 'disciplines' organised the space. Each individual was allocated a place, a functional position, simultaneously his or her place of residence and rank. Such 'disciplinary spaces' were established everywhere, in part according to the model of monasteries and barracks, places where individuals gathered together in larger numbers". 16) Thus, for instance, the increasing division of the production process forced a new spatial arrangement in the factory halls of the manufacturing enterprises. School classes were likewise reorganised; the "traditional school practice (one pupil working for a number of minutes with the teacher, while the remaining unorganised mass is idle and waits without supervision)" was revolutionised through the introduction of the system of school classes as "serial space", "guaranteeing control" and permitting "pupils to be isolated and allocated to special disciplinary places." 17)

Nevertheless – let us recall that Hegel's geographic justification for the inferiority of the upland Negro was related to the nomadic tribes who were forced into restless migration by the lack of water. The organisation of the new "disciplinary area" brings such "disorder" to a definitive end: it prevents "spontaneous popular uprisings" – Hegel's "outbreaks of cruel hordes" – while the segmentation of time, in turn, ends the state of "timelessness", of "lack of history" in which the Negroes – according to Hegel – and the unconscious – according to Freud – are said to be. Humanity is linked to the ability to perceive linearly fragmented units of time.

There remains the question (to be dealt with appropriately briefly) of the importance that the widespread stage-by-stage models of human development have for the identity of the science that is used to handling them (such as in psychology or pedagogy). This question is very important, inter alia because in the course of the "scientification of our surroundings" the normative force of scientific models has succeeded in prevailing inexplicably in everyday life. This "scientification of our surroundings is reflected in the fact that the possibility of the individual formation of identity is increasingly being prescribed into rationally determined tracks by the sciences and their terminologies." 18)

Consensus might possibly be achieved rapidly if the reproach of the lack of transparency that the normative nature of science suffers from in the stage-by-stage model (in the sense of a "secret elite model" 19)) need only be applied to empirical and measuring development psychology or the "psychology of childhood" of E. Spranger (such as in Gstettner, 20)); however, my considerations so far also raise the question whether it is not precisely also the "pillar saints" of a social science that sees itself as a critical science – Hegel and Freud – that must be exposed to this reproach.

Both political and therapeutic practice regularly encounter the problem of the premature claiming of objectives – in the sense of "healing utopias, expectations of healing, etc. – and in this anticipation having to denounce, exclude and "betray" any "outside element" that does not yet correspond with this normative postulate. In the name of the "higher", the actual objective of psychoanalytic practice or Marxist politics, the "lower" must be encouraged to raise itself, and the emancipatory character of the psychoanalytic or the Marxist method is then seen as merely being the offering of assistance to a kind of "self-raising" of the "lower" – in contrast to the traditional domination strategy of attempting to raise the "lower" to the higher, preferably by means of destruction (or enslavement – see Hegel). Nevertheless, both strategies, the traditional and the quasi-emancipatory, have in common the fact that the starting point is the difference between the dark and light poles of human development, the necessity of overcoming the inaccessible outside element. Caution is therefore necessary for the intended "assistance" – and this of course applies in particular to "development aid", which as a rule can be unmasked as a sublime form of euro-centrism, as the physical and cultural exploitation of the primitive, of women, of children, etc. It should be added that this could also explain why it is precisely the Marxist and psychoanalytical theories that show a certain susceptibility to being set up as ideologies of domination; I consider it to be relatively more urgent to deal with this problem than to seek consensus in, for instance, the criticism of religion or other forms of domination ideologies. For example, it can be assumed that both theories (Freud speaks explicitly of metapsychology as the mythology of the psychoanalytical movement) contain phases of a naïve metaphysics when they address the "entirely different" such as nature: phases of a naïve metaphysics that in many respects continue the fantasies with which Christian Europe imagined heaven and hell.

It is true that ethnologists have found in cultures on all the continents that the alien is experienced as being unsettling, daemonic, incalculable and dangerous; that thus the fact that one's own group is held to be the centre point of the world, that only one's own people are regarded as "humans", and that the alien is treated with distrust or hostility can apparently not be regarded as an individual case but rather as an "anthropological constant". But none of these cultures that have been researched by ethnologists has ever managed to conceive a universal theory about the alien and the need to neutralise it, and none of these "primitive" cultures has been able to acquire the means and the possibilities of implementing this universal theory in the history of the world. This "privilege" is held only by the European culture.

On the question of the importance that the formation of such a theory can have for the identity of the intellectuals involved in its creation, one must remember who these intellectuals are: firstly, members of the culture that succeeded in prevailing as the dominant culture over all other cultures; secondly the tendency is that within these cultures these intellectuals are members of the upper strata, the elite; thirdly, finally – in terms of their individual origin – they are mostly members of the petty or educated bourgeoisie with very specific desires to raise their social status and with ideas of a career. (It occurs to me that I – and many of the authors of this volume – are involved at a university of educational science that is primarily involved with the training of teachers for higher general education schools. One should note the semantics of the word "higher"!) Consequently, it can be assumed that the theorems of a stage-by-stage human development have been determined by elements that are essentially related to the identity, the self-image of the producers of such theories. This involves, for instance, the temptation to give one's own activity a meaning capable of universalisation, to "transfigure" it as it were within the horizon of the "world spirit". How is this temptation to be understood? The most obvious would no doubt be to conclude that the motif was compensatory; intellectuals largely experience themselves as being isolated from the production contexts that are of relevance to society as a whole and tend to suppress this isolation by means of a gettoisation that they themselves encourage (in their school education and the formation of their terminology and tradition). In everyday life, they are often regarded as "crackpots", "absent-minded professors", "half-mad scientists"; they are hardly at home in the form of life outside university, and themselves frequently play the role of the "alien". Might the contemporary topics of the intelligentsia – "changing the world", "educating humanity", the "kingdom of reason" – be merely intended to compensate for the distance to practical life, to production? Likewise, it could be assumed that the scientific situation of pedagogy is related to the dissolution of the private and individual possibility of education, that development psychology is merely the scientific legitimisation for a systematically organised and no longer individual disciplining of the child's world. The “scientification of the surroundings" corresponds with the remarkable distance between the individual academics and the "strangeness" of their subject.


2.         " In order to become sages, we must first become beasts …" (Montaigne)

The second question to which we intend to turn our attention relates to the topic of decolonisation. I do not, namely, believe that the calls for the decolonisation of the unconscious (in education) and for the decolonisation of our political and economic relationships with the third world can be interpreted merely as immediately obvious moral postulates; a merely moral claim would hardly be capable of eliminating the suspicion that all that has happened is that a new sequence of stages (from the hypothetical "natural condition" to colonial suppression and finally to "liberation", to the abolition of the colonial situation) has been drawn up and made binding.

Frantz Fanon, who perhaps has investigated and set out the psychological and physical deformity of the colonised like no other, considers decolonisation to be possible only under certain preconditions: "Decolonisation, which aims to change the order of the world, is (…) a programme for absolute revolution. It cannot be the result of a magical operation, a natural movement of the earth or a peaceful agreement." 21) The process of decolonisation must derive from the experience of the colonised and must actually destroy, overthrow this specific experience during its course. The essential experience of colonial domination includes hate and envy: "The look that the native turns on the settlers' town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession, all manners of possession: to sit at the settler's table, to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife if possible, the colonised man is an envious man. And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, 'they want to take our place'. It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's place." 22) Thus there seems to be a large risk that decolonisation, if it does not completely revolutionise colonial experience, will only lead to the finite satisfaction of hate and envy on the part of a few who establish themselves as the "native oligarchy". Fanon is particularly suspicious of the colonised intellectuals: "The colonised intellectual had learnt from his teachers that the individual must prevail." 23) And in certain decolonised territories, finally, one can find "the same intellectuals as industrious, crafty and deceitful individuals. They have kept the forms of behaviour and thinking that they had adopted in their relationships with the colonialist bourgeoisie. As spoiled children, yesterday of colonialism, today of the new state power, they organise the plundering of the wealth that has remained in the country." 24) As a counter-utopia, Fanon proposes the release from colonial experience that is the power of the common struggle, of "cleaning violence": "To explode the colonial world, from now on this is a very clear and very understandable form of action; it can be taken on by every individual colonised person. To dissolve the colonial world does not mean that the breaking down of borders will be followed by transitions between the two zones. Destroying the colonial world means no more and no less than destroying one of the two zones, stamping it as deeply as possible into the ground, or banishing it from the territory." 25) The history of decolonisation, however, has to date not been able to provide a convincing example for the practical effectiveness of this counter-utopia; and even the strategies of an "uncoupling from the world market" as currently proposed by the most reflective of development politics theoreticians has had little echo in the countries concerned: the example of Cambodia, on the contrary, shows that deliberate isolation can go hand in hand with a surrender to a neighbouring state that is militarily more powerful (because allied with a major power). Other examples can be taken from the successful struggles for liberation in southern Africa and the difficulties following the seizure of power by the liberation movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, etc.

What does it mean when European intellectuals propose to the third world that it should not aim for the western standard of living but should rather reflect on its own "Spartan" origins? What pipedreams encourage the enthusiasm for the "simple life" of the guerrilla in the civilised industrial metropolises? "What, however, if this 'totally different' does not exist at all? Those peoples who, proud of their own tradition, untainted by 'consumerism', not as decadent, as "wrecked" but instead older, purer, less corruptible than we, pursuing their own project of the human accompanied by sacrifice and deprivation – perhaps they only exist in the imagination of those who are looking for them? And does this search not also have a fatal side? Does it not bring back the old dilemma of the anthropologist who only sees his own ghosts in the mirror of the alien? Is the 'third world' ultimately nothing more than a projection?" 26) For this reason, Hans Magnus Enzensberger recommends "taking leave of such dreams. That liberation can be delegated to the distant others was always an illusion; today, this self-deception has become a threadbare excuse. There are no longer any exotic alternatives to industrial civilisation. We are encircled and besieged by our imitators." 27)

All in all, therefore, it is no accident that we are unable to identify the path for the decolonisation of our own unconscious – unless, again, by taking the risk of charismatic doctrines of salvation. In a certain respect, it is certainly of exemplary significance that the "alternatives" today are being sought both in the distance of the exotic and different (one only need look at publishers' lists: Indian/African/Asian mythologies are highly popular) and in the "psycho-boom" of a wide range of partly competing therapies: occasionally, the desire for decolonisation enters into extremely strange alliances such as in the movement of the Bhagwan, who has succeeded in binding his sect by means of modern therapeutic techniques (encounter groups and the like). In addition, there is a whole branch of dubious practices ranging from "reincarnation therapy" to "rebirthing" and "death workshops" that appear under the heading of new therapy forms – above all from a financial point of view. …

In addition, Peter Gstettner, for instance (in an unpublished lecture on the topic of "What does the decolonisation of education mean?"), has pointed out that the problems of school policies in the civilised and in the so-called development" countries are of comparable dimensions. "The consequences of the colonial heritage for today's African schools are far-reaching. The development of the last decades has been according to the ideas of European education planning, i.e. along 'linear expansion'. This has meant that many African countries today have extremely high schooling figures, but at the same time have been unable to reduce the level of illiteracy." 28) At various education conferences (Lagos 1976, Brazzaville 1978) the linking of education and productive work has been set up as an objective in the sense of a "non-linear strategy of change and innovation"; the following three postulates could apply as the mottos for this decolonisation strategy:

"a)        Any education should be aimed at communicating a positive basic attitude to productive work.

b)         The principle of productive work should be included in the training programme within all education structures.

c)         The capacity to work productively should also become an element of basic education to be communicated outside the school              as part of adult education." 29)

How should such resolutions by African education conferences be handled? It is no doubt of little use to imagine further intellectual liberation mythologies; nor, moreover, can the matter be dealt with by means of the theoretical identification with Freire's theses, with the introduction of alternative forms of science – from group dynamics to action research. Perhaps the postulate of the interlocking of education and productive work reveals the necessity of breaking out from one's own university isolation and escaping the academic ghetto. Finally, Gstettner rightly argues that it is necessary to learn what "decolonisation" might mean for our own education system (with its classifications of "below" and "above"): "Can our school system, in which we have not even managed to impose the common education and upbringing of all children up to the age of 14, in which productive activity of the brain is separated radically for that of the rest of the body, still be praised as a 'model'?" 30) And what does such a radical reform of our educational system require as a precondition as a matter of principle? "Where the private acquisition of social wealth dominates, any education is reduced to collective responsibility, to an ideological phrase. It is at best a new legitimisation for a more effective exploitation. This probably applies to education in Africa just as much as to education here." 31)

To return to the overall topic of this article (and hence to the conclusion): In general, it is scepticism that remains – on the one hand against a "theory of sublimation" as "development history" with system-immanent stage-by-stage logic, and on the other hand against a utopia from which the reversal of model-logic fixation can merely be derived as a theoretical approach. What would have to be changed is what, as a way of life of the intelligence as the apparent identity of science, is used to applying its normative force against the different, the sensual, the natural, the below, the black, the unsuitable and the incomprehensible. And such a change would be more than can be achieved by means of a theoretical contribution.



Hegel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of History" are referred to in the text by means of references to pages of the Anniversary Edition (edited by Hermann Glockner), Vol. XI, Stuttgart 1949; Freud's "Lectures on the Introduction to Psychoanalysis. And New Series" are also quoted according to the Study Edition (edited by Alexander Mitscherlich et al.), Vol. I, Frankfurt am Main 1969.

+          This article arose from the revision of a lecture entitled "Are we Africa?" that I held at the International Hegel Congress 1982 at the Panthaios University in Athens. I should like to thank my friend and colleague Thomas Hartmann for his assistance. Without him, this article might never have blackened the white of the paper.


1)            Sigmund Freud, on the question of lay analysis, in: collected writings, Vol. IX, Vienna 1928, 321

"In psychology we can only describe things by the help of analogies. There is nothing peculiar in this ; it is the case elsewhere as well. But we have constantly to keep changing these analogies, for none of them lasts us long enough. Accordingly, in trying to make the relation between the ego and the id clear, I must ask you to picture the ego as a kind of facade of the id, as a frontage, like an external, cortical, layer of it. We can hold on to this last analogy .We know that cortical layers owe their peculiar characteristics to the modifying influence of the external medium on which they abut. Thus we suppose that the ego is the layer of the mental apparatus (of the id) which has been modified by the influence of the external world (of reality). This will show you how in psychoanalysis we take spatial ways of looking at things seriously. For us the ego is really something superficial and the id something deeper – looked at from outside, of course. The ego lies between reality and the id, which is what is truly mental.

"I will not ask any questions yet as to how all this can be known. But tell me first what you gain from this distinction between an ego and an id? What leads you to make it?'

Your question shows me the right way to proceed. For the important and valuable thing is to know that the ego and the id differ greatly from each other in several respects. The rules governing the course of mental acts are different in the ego and the id; the ego pursues different purposes and by other methods. A great deal could be said about this; but perhaps you will be content with a fresh analogy and an example. Think of the difference between 'the front' and 'behind the lines', as things were during the war. We were not surprised then that some things were different at the front from what they were behind the lines, and that many things were permitted behind the lines which had to be forbidden at the front. The determining influence was, of course, the proximity of the enemy; in the case of mental life it is the proximity of the external world. There was a time when 'outside', 'strange' and 'hostile' were identical concepts. And now we come to the example. In the id there are no conflicts; contradictions and antitheses persist side by side in it unconcernedly, and are often adjusted by the formation of compromises. In similar circumstances the ego feels a conflict which must be decided; and the decision lies in one urge being abandoned in favour of the other. The ego is an organization characterized by a very remarkable trend towards unification, towards synthesis. This characteristic is lacking in the id; it is, as we might say, 'all to pieces'; its different urges pursue their own purposes independently and regardless of one another.

2)         Fritz Kramer, Verkehrte Welten. Zur imaginären Ethnographie des 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main. 1977, S. 59

3)         Sigmund Freud, Zeitgemäßes über Krieg und Tod, in: Studienausgabe Band IX, Frankfurt am Main 1974, p. 49

4)         Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough", in: Sprachanalyse und Soziologie (ed. Rolf                              Wiggershaus), Frankfurt am Main 1975, p. 45

5)         Sigmund Freud, die Zukunft einer Illusion, in: Studienausgabe Band IX, loc. cit., p. 144

6)         Sigmund Freud, Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, in: Studienausgabe Band IX, loc. cit., p. 530

7)         Kramer, loc. cit., p. 59 f.

8)         Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werkausgabe Band VII (ed. Eva Moldenhauer and                Karl Markus Michel), Frankfurt am Main. 1970, p. 320

9)         Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel (Ed.), Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualität, Frankfurt am Main. 1977. p. 7 and 11 ff.

10)       Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Bonn 1960, p. 59 ff.

11)       Cf. for instance, Paul Roazen, Sigmund Freud und sein Kreis. Eine biographische Geschichte der Psychoanalyse,                            Bergisch-Gladbach 1976, p. 247

12)       Peter Gstettner, Die Eroberung des Kindes durch die Wissenschaft. Aus der Geschichte der Disziplinierung, Reinbek bei                    Hamburg 1981, p. 133
           cf. also Elisabeth Wiesbauer, Das Kind als Objekt der Wissenschaft, Vienna 1981

13)       Quoted from Jürgen Langenbach, Selbstzerstörung. Zur Identität von abstrakter Arbeit (Technik) und Faschismus, Munich                  1982, p. 7

14)       Gstettner, loc. cit., p. 64 ff.

15)       Katharina Rutschky (Ed.), Schwarze Pädagogik, Quellen zur Naturgeschichte der bürgerlichen Erziehung, Frankfurt am Main.             1977, p. LX

16)       Gstettner, loc. cit., p. 49

17)       ibid, p. 51

18)       Jakob Huber, Zur Identitätsbildung von Individuen und Kollektiven, in: ibid. (Ed.), Soziale Identität und Gruppendynamik,                      Klagenfurt 1978, p. 25 f.

19)        Gstettner, loc. cit. p. 120

20)        ibid, p. 120 ff.

21)        Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1969, p. 27

22)        ibid, p. 30

23)        ibid, p. 36

24)        ibid, p. 37

25)        ibid, p. 31

26)        Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Eurozentrismus wider Willen. Ein politisches Vexierbild, in: Transatlantik No. 10/80, Munich                  1980, p. 66

27)        ibid, p. 67

28)        Peter Gstettner, Was heißt Entkolonisierung von Erziehung? Unpublished manuscript of a lecture on March 29 1982 at the                University for Educational Sciences Klagenfurt, p. 22

29)        ibid, p. 25

30)        ibid, p. 35 f.

31)        ibid, p. 35


Trauerarbeitsplatz comment 1997:

This article played a satchel-filling role as a paper in the temporary museum project Trauerarbeitsplätze II by Ilse Stockhammer-Wagner and Helmut Stockhammer in place of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and is also part of TRAUERARBEITSPLATZ 8 INTERNET.


Snapshots in black and white, or:
Where is africa?